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826 JoHNSTON v. CITY oF CLAREMONT [49 C.2d 
[L.A. No. 24247. In Bank. Mar. 
PHILIP F. JOHNSTON et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. 
CI'l'Y OF CLAREMONT et al., Defendants and Appel-
lants. 
Municipal Corporations-Referendum-Zoning Ordinances.-A 
rezoning ordinance that amends a general zoning ordinance of 
a general law city is subject to referendum. (Const., art. IV, 
§ 1.) 
[2] Statutes- Legislative Power- Referendum.- The power of 
referendum may be invoked only with respect to matters that 
are strictly legislative in character. 
[3] Counties-Boards-Powers.-A board of supervisors in grant-
ing a permit under a zoning ordinance acts in an administra-
tive capacity. 
[4] Zoning-Amendment of Zoning Laws.-A zoning ordinance 
constitutes the exercise of a governmental and legislative func-
tion and is subject to change by the legislative power. (Gov. 
Code, § 65804.) 
[5] Statutes-Amendment.-The amendment of a legislative act is 
itself a legislative act; the power to legislate includes by 
necessary implication the power to amend existing legislation. 
[6] Zoning-Amendment of Zoning Laws.-Rezoning of use dis-
tricts or changes of uses and restrictions within a district can 
be accomplished only through an amendment of a zoning ordi-
nance and the amendment must be made in the same mode as 
its original enactment. (Gov. Code, § 65804.) 
[7] Municipal Corporations-Zoning Ordinances-Amendments.-
Where a city council amends a zoning ordinance so as to ex-
clude from a particular zone property previously included in 
such zone, its act in amending is legislative, not administrative. 
[8] Zoning - Amendment of Zoning Laws.- Under Gov. Code, 
§ 65804, the changing of property from one zone to another 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Initiative, Referendum and Recall, § 28. 
[4] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp., Zoning, § 40; Am.Jur., Zoning, 
§ 169 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: (1, 9, 10, 12] Municipal Corporations, 
§ 253(2); [2] Statutes, § 34; [3] Counties, §55; [4, 6, 8, 13] Zon-
ing, § 5; [5] Statutes, § 73; [7] Municipal Corporations, § 156; 
[11] Municipal Corporations, § 253; [14) Municipal Corporations, 
§ 152; [15, 16] :tv1unicipal Corporations, § 145; [17, 19] Municipal 
Corporations,§ 160; [18] Municipal Corporations,§ 152; [20, 23-25] 
Municipal Corporations, § 144; [21] Municipal Corporations, 
§244.5; [22] Statutes, §10; [26] Easements, §14. 
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must be an ordinance am,endmlgo the original 
ordinance. 
[9] Ivlunicipal and Referendum-Zoning 
Ordinances.-No objection, such as that procedural steps re-
quired to be taken after the adoption of an ordinance provid-
for street improvements would be circumvented if the 
were subjected to either the initiative or the refer-
exists with to a ordinance to 
since steps by the 
Legislature in such case must be taken before the adoption of 
the ordinance; on the other hand, the objection would apply 
where a zoning ordinance was adopted by a general law city by 
means of an initiative measure without compliance with the 
general law relating to zoning. 
[10] !d.-Referendum-Zoning Ordinances.-The legislative body 
of a general law city cannot validly adopt a zoning ordinance 
without complying with the zoning act, and where it has com-
plied with the requirements of the act the ordinance is subject 
to referendum. 
[11] !d.-Referendum-Scope of Power.-Whenever a city council 
acts in its legislative capacity, the action it takes is subject 
to the constitutional right of referendum unless such action 
falls into one of the exceptions provided for in the Constitu-
tion. 
[12] !d.-Referendum-Zoning Ordinances.-The right of referen-
dum with respect to zoning ordinances is essential for the pro-
tection of the rights of the electors of each city; what is done 
with respect to one piece of property of necessity has an effect, 
good or bad, on adjacent or nearby property. 
[13] Zoning-Amendment of Zoning Laws.-Where the wording of 
zoning ordinances must be changed in order to accomplish a 
desired revision, the act is legislative, not administrative; but 
where a regulation is changed pursuant to an existing ordi-
nance permitting an administrative variance on the finding of 
certain facts, the act is administrative. 
[14a, 14b] Municipal Corporations-Zoning Ordinances-Reason-
ableness.-The zoning of plaintiffs' boulevard property for resi-
dential and agricultural use in a general zoning ordinance was 
not unreasonable, oppressive, arbitrary or discriminatory in the 
light of the trial court's finding that the highway conditions 
in front of such property rendered its boulevard frontage more 
reasonably usable and suitable for commercial purposes than 
for residential or agricultural purposes, that substantially all 
the property contiguous to and for some distance east and 
west along the boulevard was zoned for business, and that next 
to plaintiffs' property there was a reservoir, water well and 
pumping plant which for many years had been used for com· 
828 C.2d 
mercial of reasonableness of the 
ordinance was there was a reasonable basis for 
the action of the zoning authorities. 
[15] !d.-Zoning Ordinances-Legislative Discretion and Court 
Review.-Although the courts will inquire whether a zoning 
ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable, the decision of the 
zoning authorities on matters of opinion and policy will not 
he set aside or disregarded the courts unless the regulations 
have no reasonable relation to the public welfare or unless the 
physical facts show that there has been an unreasonable, op-
pressive or unwarranted interference with property rights in 
the exercise of the police power. 
[16] Id. - Zoning Ordinances- Legislative Discretion and Court 
Review.-The wisdom of the prohibitions and restrictions in a 
zoning ordinance is a matter for legislative determination, and 
though a court may not agree with that determination it will 
not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning authorities 
if there is any reasonable for their action. 
[17] Id.- Zoning Ordinances- Appeal-Conclusiveness of Find-
ings.-The findings and conclusions of the trial court on the 
reasonableness of a zoning ordinance are not binding on an 
appellate court if the record shows that the question is debat-
able and that there may be a difference of opinion on the 
subject. 
[18] !d.-Zoning Ordinances-Reasonableness.-Exercises of the 
police power are apt to have an adverse effect on property 
interests, and the fact that some hardship is experienced or 
that it may be more profitable to make other use of the prop-
erty, or that the property would be more valuable if it were 
commercially zoned, is not controlling in determining whether 
the zoning regulations are arbitrary or unreasonable. 
[19] Id.- Zoning Ordinances- Appeal- Scope of Review.-The 
function of a reviewing court in a zoning ease is to determine 
whether the record shows a reasonable basis for the action of 
the zoning authorities, and if the reasonableness of the ordi-
nance is fairly debatable the legislative determination will not 
be disturbed. 
[20] !d.-Zoning Ordinances-Validity.-A city ordinance purport-
ing to rezone a portion of plaintiffs' property from residential 
to commercial was not validly enacted where the procedure for 
redistricting, set forth in the original ordinance and followed 
in the new one, was in conflict with the state law at the time 
the new ordinance was adopted, and where subsequent to the 
adoption of such ordinance there was no act validating any 
zoning ordinance. 
[21] Id.- Ordinances- Validation of Invalid Ordinances.-The 
purpose of a validating act is not to validate an ordinance the 
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provisions of which are in conflict with the general law of the 
state covering the same subject matter, but to declare in effect 
that though such ordinance was not adopted in accordance with 
the procedure outlined by a general law of the state, as to that 
particular ordinance there has been substantial compliance 
with such and therefore such ordinance shall be 
deemed to have been validly adopted the same as though there 
had been exact compliance. 
[22] Statutes-Curative Acts.-Validating acts operate retroac-
tively only and confer no validity on subsequent acts. 
[23] Municipal Corporations-Zoning Ordinances-Validity.-The 
fact that a city ordinance purporting to rezone a portion of 
plaintiffs' property from residential to commercial was adopted 
under a procedure authorized by a prior ordinance does not 
give it validity where such ordinance, insofar as the pro-
cedural requirements are concerned, is contrary to a specific 
declaration of the Legislature that the statewide policy is that 
a local legislative body should hold a public hearing before 
adopting substantive changes in a zoning ordinance; to give 
such force to a validating act is not reasonable, since it would 
be interpreting a validating act to say that any subsequent 
state law enacted on the subject should have no effect on any 
city which, prior to adoption of the validating act, had enacted 
an ordinance contrary to such later enacted state legislation, 
as long as sueh ordinance remained in effect. 
[24] Id.-Zoning Ordinances-Validity.-To read into a statute 
declaring that any ordinances passed pursuant to a zoning 
law or conservation or planning act the exception that all cities 
would be exempt from certain provisions thereof as long as 
having previously enacted an ordinance contrary to the statute 
such ordinance remained in effect would prevent it from having 
a uniform application, and thus the statute would be unconsti-
tutional. ( Const., art. I, § 11.) 
[25] Id.-Zoning Ordinances-Validity.-Since the Legislature has 
determined that as a matter of public policy there must be a 
hearing before the local legislative body on any ordinance 
changing the permitted use of property within the city, such 
policy must apply equally to all cities within the same class. 
[26] Easements-Creation-By Express Grant.-Where a grant 
deed by which plaintiffs gave defendant city an easement over 
their property provided for automatic defeasance should a 
certain zoning ordinance be repealed or suspended or otherwise 
not take effect, and where, on referendum, a majority of the 
voters determined that it should not become effective, the deed 
granting the easement was invalid by its terms. 
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APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Donald R. Wright, Judge pro tern.'-~ Judg-
ment reversed; for leave to produce additional evi-
dence and for Supreme Court to make additional findings, de-
nied. 
Action for relief with to a zoning ordi-
nance. Judgment that ordinance rezoning ~laintiffs' 
property as commercial property was valid, reversed. 
Harry R. Roberts for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
William G. Bergman, Jr., City Attorney, Burke, Williams 
& Sorensen, Harry C. Williams and Royal M. Sorensen for 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), Ed-
ward H. Gaylord, Deputy County Counsel, Roger Arnebergh, 
City Attorney (Los Angeles), and Bourke Jones, Assistant 
City Attorney, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Appellants. 
McCOMB, J.-Plaintiffs and defendants appeal from a 
judgment in a declaratory relief action which held that an 
ordinance of the city of Claremont rezoning plaintiffs' prop-
erty as commercial property was valid. 
Plaintiffs' property is located on the southwest corner of 
Foothill Boulevard and Mountain A venue in Claremont, ex-
tending 959 feet in a westerly direction along the south side 
of Foothill and 569 feet in a southerly direction along the 
west side of Mountain. Most of it is planted in citrus trees, 
but on the northeast corner there are a reservoir, water well, 
and pumping plant, which have been used for many years 
for commercial purposes. 
The northern and western borders of plaintiffs' property 
constitute the boundaries between Claremont and land which 
is unincorporated territory of Los Angeles County. 
Foothill Boulevard is a widely travelled highway. The 
unincorporated area on both sides of the highway for a distance 
of several miles has been zoned C-1 by the county, a zoning 
which permits commercial establishments such as retail stores, 
gasoline stations, and restaurants. A great deal of such land 
is being devoted to commercial uses. 'fhe property on the 
*Assigned by Chairman of J udieial Council. 
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south side of Foothill west of plaintiffs' prop· 
erty is used for a trailer sales business. 
Next to property on the south, there is a sub-
stantial area which has been zoned R-1 (single family resi-
dence) by the of Claremont. The eastern side of Mountain 
is zoned residential for several blocks north and south of 
Foothill. East of Mountain on Foothill there is no commercial 
zoning for over a block and no commercial use for about two 
blocks. 
According to the latest estimate available at the time of 
trial, Claremont had a population of about 9,000. A down-
town area of approximately six square blocks is zoned for 
C-2 (commercial) uses. In addition, a four-block strip on 
Foothill, principally on the southern side, has been zoned 
commercial since 1953. There is evidence that only a few 
lots are vacant in either of these commercial zones, but single 
family residences are located on more than two square blocks 
of the downtown area. 
Although one real estate appraiser who had investigated 
the area testified that in his opinion a profit of $38,600 could 
be realized from subdividing plaintiffs' property for resi-
dential purposes under a plan providing for lots which would 
back onto Foothill, another one testified that in his opinion 
such a subdivision would result in a loss of $7,800. 
A zoning consultant for the city of Claremont and other 
cities was of the opinion that the city was essentially resi-
dential in character and that there should be no more com-
mercial use permitted on the south side of Foothill. There 
was also testimony to the effect that the city has zoned 50 
per cent more land for commercial purposes than the size of 
the population would indicate is currently needed, and, in the 
opinion of a zoning expert, an excess commercial zoning of 
25 per cent to 30 per cent is a reasonable amount for future 
expansion. Other testimony, however, was to the effect that 
there should be twice as much commercial zoning as is neces-
sary at present. 
CHRON'OLOGY 
i. In 1951 defendant city of Claremont, a sixth class city, 
adopted a general zoning plan, ordinance Number 441, under 
the general law. Plaintiffs' property was zoned for agri-
cultural and residential use. 
By the terms of the general zoning ordinance as originally 
adopted, a public hearing was required to be held by the 
832 [49 C.2d 
planning commission on any for redistricting, but 
none was expressly by the ordinance to be held 
thereafter by the city council. 
ii. On May 3, plaintiffs filed a request with the city 
council for a change in the zoning of their property from 
a residential zone to a commercial zone. A public hearing 
was held by the planning commission, and thereafter the 
commission referred plaintiffs' request, without recommenda-
tion, to the city council. 
iii. On June 1, 1954, without further public notice, the city 
council adopted ordinance No. 503, purporting by its terms to 
rezone a portion of plaintiffs' property from a residential to a 
commercial zone. A week later and without notice to plaintiffs, 
the city council purported to adopt an emergency measure, 
ordinance No. 504, reciting that the general zoning ordinance 
did not conform to the Government Code of the State of Cali-
fornia and providing that ordinance No. 503 be repealed. 
Ordinance No. 503 was never published as required by law. 
iv. On July 29, 1954, the city council, by ordinance Number 
507, amended the general zoning ordinance Number 441 to 
require a public hearing by both the planning commission and 
the city council on applications for rezoning. 
v. On September 21, 1954, after the effective date of ordi-
nance No. 507, plaintiffs filed a second request for the rezoning 
of their boulevard frontage to a depth of 300 feet. This appli-
cation was referred to the planning commission, which held a 
public hearing on October 19, 1954, but the commission failed 
to act upon the application within the 40-day period pre-
scribed by ordinance No. 441, as amended by ordinance No. 
507, resulting in an approval by operation of law of plaintiffs' 
application. 
vi. On December 6, 1954, the city council held a public 
hearing upon plaintiffs' application. 
vii. On December 14, 1954, defendant city adopted ordi-
nance No. 513, the effect of which was to rezone plaintiffs' 
boulevard frontage property from an R-1 zone (single family 
residence) to a C-2 zone (commercial). 
viii. Concurrently with the adoption of ordinance No. 513 
rezoning plaintiffs' boulevard frontage, plaintiffs delivered 
to the city a grant deed conveying a 20-foot easement over the 
most easterly portion of their boulevard frontage for the 
widening of Mountain A venue, which deed provided for the 
automatic defeasance of the grant should ordinance No. 513 
Mar.1958] JOHNSTON v. CITY OF CLAREMONT 
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be repealed or suspended or otherwise not take effect accord-
ing to its terms. The city council accepted this grant deed 
according to the terms thereof. 
ix. About January 3, 1955, there were filed with the city 
clerk referendum petitions signed by 829 registered voters of 
the city, entitled ''Referendum Petition Against Ordinance 
No. 513 Redistricting Certain Property in the City of Clare· 
mont Located at the Southwest Corner of Mountain A venue 
and Foothill Boulevard From an R-1 Zone (single family 
residence) to a C-2 Zone (heavy commercial)." 
x. Pursuant to said referendum petition, a special election 
was held May 3, 1955, to submit to the electors the question 
of whether ordinance No. 513 should be approved. 
xi. On May 10, 1955, after a canvass of the returns it was 
determined that a majority1 of the voters had voted against 
the adoption of ordinance No. 513. 
xii. On August 5, 1955, plaintiffs instituted the present 
declaratory relief action seeking to have it held that ordinance 
No. 513 was valid. 
xiii. After trial, the court found : 
(a) That ordinance No. 513 complied in all respects with 
the requirements of the general zoning law of defendant 
-eity and with state law; that it was not subject to referendum 
under the laws of the State of California; and that as a neces-
sary corollary plaintiffs' deed to the city was a valid and sub-
sisting grant of an easement; 
(b) That the highway conditions in front of plaintiffs' 
property rendered its boulevard frontage more reasonably 
usable and suitable for commercial purposes than for residen-
tial or agricultural purposes; that substantially all the prop-
erty in the county contiguous to and for some distance east 
and west along Foothill Boulevard was and had been zoned 
for business; and that next to plaintiffs' property there were 
a reservoir, water well, and pumping plant which for many 
years had been used for commercial purposes; 
(e) That ordinance No. 503 was invalid because it was 
not adopted in conformity with the requirements of state 
law then in effect ; and 
SOf the ballots east in per110n, the eleetion was fo11Dd to be a tie, 
with 1153 votes for the ordinanee and the same number against, but 
when the 44 absentee ballots were counted. •rdinuee N .. Ill wu 
d.teated by a mareba of 84 Yok&. 
.C.M-11 
DEFENDANTS' APPEAL 
r·ezon:1ny ordinance that amends a gen-
the sixth class (general law 
are here "1''~-'''"••"'-"' 
Constitution reserves the referendum power to the 
including the voters of cities without charters, with 
certain not to the case. (Cal. 
Const., art. 
[2] 2. The power of referendum may be invoked only with 
respect to matters which are strictly legislative in character. 
(Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal.2d 125, 129 [1] [222 P.2d 225]; 
Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 511 [3] [253 P. 932] ; 
Chase v. Kalber, 28 Cal.App. 561, 568 et seq. [153 P. 397].) 
[3] 3. A board of supervisors in granting a permit under 
a zoning ordinance acts in an administrative capacity. (John-
ston v. Board of Supervisors, 31 Cal.2d 66, 74 [6] (187 P.2d 
686] ; Essick v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 614, 623 [3] 
(213 P.2d 492).) 
[4] 4. A zoning ordinance constitutes the exercise of a 
governmental and legislative function and is subject to change 
by the legislative power. (Gov. Code, § 65804; 8 McQuillin, 
•section 1 of article IV of the Constitution provides, in part: "The 
second power reserved to the people shall be known as the referendum. 
No act passed hy the Legislature shall go into effect until 90 days after 
the final adjournment of the session of the Legislature which passed 
such act, except acts calling elections, acts providing for tax levies or 
appropriations for the usual current expenses of the State, and urgency 
measures necessary for the immediate preservation of the publie peace, 
health or safety, passed by a two-thirds vote of all the members elected 
to each house. 
"· .. provided, however, that no measure creating or abolishing any 
offiee or changing the salary, term or duties 'If any officer, or granting 
any franchise or special privilege, or creating any vested right or in-
terest, shall be construed to be an urgency measure .... 
"The initiative and referendum powers of the people are hereby 
further reserved to the electflrs of eaeh county, city and county, city 
and town of the State to be exercised under such procedure as may 
b6 provided by law .... Nothing contained in this section shall be 
construed as affecting or limiting the present or future powers of 
cities or cities and counties having charters adopted under the pro-
visions of Section 8 of Article XI of this Constitution ...• This section 
is self-executing, but legislation may be enaeted to facilitate its op-
eration, but in no way limiting or restricting either tAe prov.isiou Of 
this seetioD or the powen llerein reservecl." 
ing, § 25.245, p. 5944 ; Blotter v. 
[6] [270 P.2d 481] .) 
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must be made in the 
(Gov. § 65804 : 
ed. rev. 1957), Zon-
42 Cal.2d 804, 811 
[7] We must therefore determine 
city council act in an administrative 
capacity in adopting ordinance No. 513? 
: Did the 
In view of the it is evident that the amend-
ment of legislation is legislative in character and 
that where, as here, the council amends a zoning ordinance so 
as to exclude from a particular zone property previously in-
cluded in such zone, its act in amending is a legislative act 
and not an administrative aet. 
It is to be noted that this is an different situation 
from one in which a zoning ordinance confers upon the coun-
cil or an official the power to an easement or variance 
in a particular case. (See Johnston v. Board of S1tpervisors, 
supra; Essick v. Oity of Los 
[8] section 65804 of the Government Code5 pro-
'In 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations ed. rev. 1957), Zoning, 
\125.65, p. 145, it is said: "· .. a zoning constitutes an ex· 
ercise of a governmental and legislative function and, hence, is subject 
to change by the legislative power." 
'In 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed. rev. 1957), Zoning, 
§ 25.245, p. 594, it is said: "Generally, rezoning of use districts or 
~henges of uses and restrictions within a district can be accomplished 
only through an amendment of the zoning ordinance, and the amend· 
ment must be made in the same mode as its original enactment. Amend· 
ments are subject to limitations set by the general law or charter, and 
the amendment of such ordinances must be enacted as prescribed. 
Generally. the amendment can be effected by an ordinance enacted 
by the municipal legislative body, ani! by a mere resolution or 
order." 
•section 65804 of the Government Code reads: "Except as otherwise 
provided in this article, an amendment to a zoning ordinance which 
amendment changes any property from one zone to another or imposes 
836 JOHNSTON v. CITY OF CLAREMONT [49 C.2d 
vides that the changing of property from one zone to another 
must be accomplished by an ordinance amending the original 
ordinance. 
This conclusion is in accord with the views expressed by 
this court in several previous decisions. In Dwyer v. City 
Council, 200 Cal. 505, 515 [253 P. 932], we said: "A zoning 
ordinance as amended becomes in effect a different ordinance. 
Even if it be granted that a reclassification of an area as 
c;mall as that involved in the instant case cannot be said to 
effect a new scheme, the same rule must necessarily be fol-
lowed as would be applied if a larger area had been reclassi-
fied, and it may be observed that a piecemeal rezoning of small 
areas may result in a plan differing in vital particulars from 
that originally contemplated." 
In Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 341 
[5] [175 P.2d 542], it was held that whether an area of gen-
eral use within a zone of limited use should be expanded was 
"clearly within the discretion of the legislative body of the 
city." 
In Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453, 460 [2] 
[202 P.2d 38, 7 A.L.R.2d 990], Mr. Chief Justice Gibson, 
speaking for this court, said : "In enacting zoning ordinances, 
the municipality performs a legislative function, and every 
intendment is in favor of the validity of such ordinances.'' 
(Italics added.) 
[9] It has been held that referendum is not available in 
street improvement cases. (Chase v. Kalber, 28 Ca1.App. 561, 
573 et seq. [153 P. 397] ; Starbuck v. City of Fullerton, 34 Cal. 
App. 683, 684 et seq. [168 P. 583]; St. John v. King, 130 Cal. 
App. 356, 366 et seq. [20 P.2d 123].) However, it should be 
noted that the Legislature has prescribed procedural steps to 
be taken after the adoption of an ordinance providing for 
street improvements, which steps would be circumvented if 
the proceedings were subjected to either the initiative or the 
referendum. (Chase v. Kalber, supra, at p. 573 et seq.) But 
no such objection exists with respect to subjecting a zoning 
ordinance to the referendum, since the procedural steps pre-
scribed by the Legislature in such a case must be taken before 
the adoption of the ordinance. On the other hand, the objec-
tion would apply where a zoning ordinance was adopted by a 
any regulation listed in Section 65800 not theretofore imposed or re-
moves or modifies any such regulation theretofore imposed shall be 
initiated and adopted in the same manner as required for the initiation 
and adoption of the original zoning ordinance.'' 
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general law city by means of an initiative measure without 
compliance with the general law relating to zoning. It has 
been held that an ordinance adopted under such circumstances 
was void for that reason. (Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 
Cal. 134, 140 [5] [277 P. 308].) 
It was pointed out in the Hurst case, supra, at page 140 [4] 
et seq., that the electors of a city or county can adopt under 
the initiative law only such ordinances as the legislative body 
thereof would have had the power to enact. (See also Blotter 
v. Farrell, 42 Cal.2d 804, 810 [ 5] [270 P .2d 481].) [10] Clear-
ly, the legislative body of a general law city could not validly 
adopt a zoning ordinance without complying with the zoning 
act. Where such body has adopted a zoning ordinance, com-
plying with the requirements of the act, there is no reason 
not to subject the ordinance to referendum. This principle 
was recognized in the Hurst case, supra. 
There the proponents of the initiative measure relied 
upon Dwyer v. City Council, supra, and in answer to their 
contention this court said, at page 142: "The question of the 
operation of the initiative law to such local legislation was 
not involved in the Dwyer case and therefore no necessity 
arose to distinguish between the effectiveness of the initiative 
and the referendum in zoning cases. If the point were in-
volved it would undoubtedly be conceded that had the board 
of trustees of the City of Burlingame adopted a zoning or-
dinance as provided by the statute, its final action would be 
subject to the referendum provisions of the constitution and 
laws of the state, for the obvious reason that there is embodied 
in the enactment of a zoning ordinance such elements of legis-
lative action as to subject the ordinance when adopted to the 
reserved legislative power of the electors of the city, when 
properly invoked, to approve or reject it." (Italics added.) 
[11] Whenever the council acts in its legislative capacity, 
the action it takes is subject to the constitutional right of 
referendum unless such action falls into one of the exceptions 
provided for in the Constitution. 
[12] The right of referendum with respect to zoning ordi-
nances is essential for the protection of the rights of the 
electors of each city. A zoning ordinance can and does have 
a more direct and lasting effect upon property values and 
property owners within a city than almost any other type of 
ordinance. What is done with respect to one piece of prop-
erty of necessity has an effect, good or bad, upon adjacent 
or nearby property. 
section 
ordinance that ,ll,,,.u,<e" 
shall be initiated 
not administrative. 
is changed pursuant to a 
C.2d 
made between the council's act 
amendments there-
an amendment to a 
""'"""''"~" from one zone to another 
the same manner as an 
regulation 
eAJL<>Vllll-: Ordinance 
an administrative variance upon the of 
v. Gregg, certain facts, the act is administrative. 
90 Cal.App.2d 363 [7] P.2d 37] .) 
Therefore, since defendant ci1 adopting ordinance 
No. 513, was amending the ordinance to change 
certain property from one zone to it was acting pur-
suant to its inherent power to amend its legislative act and 
thus was acting in a legislative capacity. As it was acting 
in a legislative capacity in the ordinance, the ordi-
nance was subject to referendum. 
PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL 
[14a] Questions: First. Was the zonin.g of plaintiffs' boule-
vard property for residential, and agricultural use in the gen-
eral zoning ordinance No. 441 unreasonable, oppressive, arbi-
trary and discriminatory, in the light of the kial court's 
finding (b), supra? 
No. [15] It is settled that, although the courts will, of 
course, inquire as to whether a zoning ordinance is arbitrary 
or unreasonable, the decision of the zoning authorities as to 
matters of opinion and policy will not be set aside or dis-
regarded by the court01 unless the regulations have no reason-
able relation to the public welfare or unless the physical facts 
show that there has been an unreasonable, oppressive, or un-
warranted interference with property rights in the exercise 
of the police power. 
[16] The wisdom of the prohibitions and restrictions is 
a matter for legislative determination, and even though a court 
may not agree with that determination, it will not substitute 
its judgment for that of the zoning authorities if there is 
any reasonable justification for their action. (Lockard v. 
()ity of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453, 461 [202 P.2d 38, 7 
Mar. JOHNSTON v. CITY OF CLAREMONT 
[ 49 C.2d 826; 323 P.2d 71J 
et seq. .) 
the trial court found that the 
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way conditions in front of rendered its 
boulevard more suitable for 
commercial purposes than for residential or 
poses and that all the 
and for some distance east and west 
was zoned for business. 
conclusions of the trial court as to the reasonableness of a 
zoning ordinance are not on an appellate court if 
the record shows that the question is debatable and that there 
may be a difference of opinion on the (Lockard v. 
City of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 462 [6].) Giving 
due consideration to the basic physical facts appearing in 
the record, such as the character of plaintiffs' property, the 
nature of the surrounding territory, the use to which each 
has been put, and recent trends of development, we have 
concluded that the question of the reasonableness of the ordi-
nance was debatable and that there was a reasonable basis 
for the action of the zoning authorities. 
[18] Even assuming, however, as would be justified from 
the record, that plaintiffs' property would be more valuable 
if it were commercially zoned, such factor would not be de-
terminative. As was said in Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 
supra, at page 466 et seq. : ''Exercises of the police power 
.•. are apt to have an adverse effect on property interests, 
and the fact that some hardship is experienced or that it may 
be more profitable to make other use of the property is not 
controlling in determining whether the regulations are arbi-
trary or unreasonable.'' [19] Furthermore, in view of our 
conclusion that there was a reasonable basis for the action 
taken, the rule is applicable as stated in the Lockard case, 
supra, at page 462, where it is said that in cases of this kind 
"the function of this court is to determine whether the record 
shows a reasonable basis for the action of the zoning au-
thorities, and, if the reasonableness of the ordinance is fairly 
debatable, the legislative determination will not be disturbed." 
[20] Second. Was ordinance No. :J03 enacted? 
No. Ordinance No. 441 was 17, 1951. It set 
forth a procedure for redistricting, which procedure was fol-
lowed in adopting ordinance No. 503. This procedure was iu 
conflict with the state law in effect at the time ordinance No. 
503 was adopted. 
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I.n 1951 (Stats. 1951, ch. 1690, p. 3897) the following was 
enacted by the Legislature : "Any ordinance or amendment 
thereto passed pursuant to the Zoning Law of 1917 or the 
Conservation and Planning Act or its predecessor, is hereby 
confirmed, validated and declared legally effective." This 
validating act is part of section 14 of chapter 1690, which 
amended the Zoning Law of 1917. 
In 1953 (Stats. 1953, ch. 1355, p. 2929) there was enacted 
by the Legislature the following : "Any ordinances passed 
pursuant to the Planning Act, the Conservation and Planning 
Act, such Article 4 [Article 4, Chapter 10, Part 2, Division 3, 
Title 4 of the Government Code], or its predecessor, prior to 
the effective date of this act, are continued in force until 
repealed pursuant to law." This validating act is section 4 
of chapter 1355, which chapter enacted the now effective 
provisions relating to the adoption of zoning ordinances by 
general law cities. Such provisions were also in effect at the 
time of the adoption of ordinance No. 503. 
Subsequent to the adoption of ordinance No. 503, 
there has been no act validating any zoning ordinance. 
Plaintiffs contend that by virtue of the validating acts 
of 1951 and 1953, all provisions of ordinance No. 441, re-
gardless of whether they were contrary to the provisions of 
the Zoning Law of 1917, the 1947 Planning and Conservation 
Act, or the 1953 act relating to zoning, were declared valid 
and effective insofar as the city of Claremont was concerned 
and superseded the general law on that subject, and that since 
ordinance No. 503 was adopted under a procedure authorized 
by ordinance No. 441 it was validly enacted. 
[21] The purpose of a validating act is not to validate 
an ordinance the provisions of which are in conflict with the 
general law of the state covering the same subject matter. 
The purpose of a validating act is to declare, in effect, that 
although such an ordinance was not adopted in accordance 
with the procedure outlined by a general law of the state, 
the Legislature, as to that particular ordinance, declares that 
there has been substantial compliance with said provisions and, 
therefore, such ordinance shall be deemed to have been 
validly adopted the same as though there had been exact 
compliance. 
[22] Validating acts operate retroactively only and confer 
no validity upon acts subsequent thereto. (50 Am.Jur. (1944), 
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Statutes, § 481, p. 504; People ex rel. Wangelin v. Pitcairn, 
371 Ill. 616 [21 N.E.2d 753, 755] .) 
[23] If plaintiffs' position were adopted, it would give 
to a validating act a prospective operation. Under such a 
theory, ordinance No. 441, insofar as the procedural re-
quirements are concerned, could remain effective forever even 
though the Legislature specifically has declared that the state-
wide policy is that a local legislative body should hold a 
public hearing before adopting substantive changes in a 
zoning ordinance. To give such force to a validating act is 
not reasonable, as it would be interpreting a validating act 
to say that any subsequent state law enacted on the subject 
should have no effect upon any city which prior to the adop-
tion of the validating act had enacted an ordinance contrary 
to such later enacted state legislation, as long as such or-
dinance remained in effect. Under such an interpretation, 
there would be implied in the act of 1953, which is the current 
act relating to zoning, a provision that this act should apply 
to all general law cities of the State of California except those 
cities previously having enacted ordinances contrary to the 
provisions of this act. 
[24] To read into the 1953 act the exception that all cities 
previously having enacted an ordinance contrary to the pro-
visions of the act would be exempt from certain provisions 
thereof as long as such ordinance remained in effect would 
prevent it from having a uniform application, and thus the 
act would be unconstitutional. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 11; State 
ex rel. Keefe v. Mcinerney, 63 Wyo. 280 [182 P.2d 28, 37]; 
Mordecai v. Board of Supervisors, 183 Cal. 434 [192 P. 40].) 
To read such an exception into the 1951 act would have the 
same effect. 
[25] Since the Legislature has determined that as a matter 
of public policy there must be a hearing before the local legis-
lative body on any ordinance changing the permitted use of 
property within the city, such policy must apply equally to 
all cities within the same class. There is no reason either in 
law or otherwise for defendant city of Claremont to be treated 
differently in this respect from any other general law city 
within the state. Therefore, no zoning ordinance adopted by 
the city of Claremont after the effective date of the current 
act relating to zoning is valid unless a hearing thereon before 
the local legislative body was held, as required by that act. 
Admittedly, no such hearing was held with respect to ordi-
defeasance of 
pealed or otherwise not take effect according 
to its terms. Therefore, since ordinance No. 513 was sub-
ject to referendum and a of the voters determined 
that it should not become the deed which plaintiffs 
gave to defendant an easement over their prop-
erty was invalid by its terms. 
APPLICATION BY PLAINTIFFS FOR LEAVE 
TO PRODUCE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE 
Plaintiffs have filed an for leave to produce cer-
tain additional evidence and have requested this court to make 
certain additional However, in view of the conclu-
sions reached it is unnecessary to take additional evi-
dence or make 
The judgment is and plaintiffs' application for 
leave to produce additional evidence and this court to make 
additional findings is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
Assuming ordinance No. 513 which placed a portion of 
plaintiffs' property in a commercial zone (it had formerly 
been in residence and zone) was properly subject 
to a referendum, I believe that plaintiffs' constitutional rights 
have been invaded by to them of the basic ordi-
nance No. 441 which zoned their property for residence and 
agriculture. Plaintiffs' lies along Foothill Boult>-
vard, a highway which is not in corporate limits of Clare-
843 
'Nhatsoever; 
Boulevard travels in 
than five miles im-
Boulevard Frontage ; 
the intersection thereof 
with :Mountain A venue is in a restricted zone and is 
limit of miles per hour; 
that the said traffic conditions upon said Foothill Boulevard 
render said more 
suitable and usable for uses and purposes, as 
authorized and the terms of said 
than for any other 
use or purpose. . . . 
"That it is true: is now, and 
has been for 
vehicular traffic 
a large volume of gases; that said fumes, 
odors and gases emitted from said traffic upon Foothill Boule-
vard have increased over the years; that as a 
direct and consequence of said and 




C-2 commercial uses and purposes, as such uses and purposes 
are authorized and in a C-2 Zone the Zoning 
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Ordinance No. as amended, than for any other use or pur-
pose. 
''That it is true: that the property west of Mountain A venue 
on the northerly side of Foothill Boulevard and across from 
plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage, to a depth ... (300) 
feet from the northerly side of Foothill Boulevard, is in the 
unincorporated territory of the County of Los Angeles and 
the same is in a C-1 Zone under the terms of said Los Angeles 
County Basic Zoning Ordinance No. 1494; that said County 
C-1 Zoned property on the north side of Foothill Boulevard 
is presently planted to lemon trees and was formerly a part 
of a large citrus grove extending northerly thereof; that said 
northerly balance or remainder of said former citrus grove 
is presently being subdivided for single family residences and 
such balance is presently owned by different owners than the 
persons owning said County C-1 zoned property; that said 
County C-1 zoned property across from plaintiffs' said Boule-
vard Frontage is more reasonably suitable for commercial 
purposes than any other use or purpose and the same is 
being presently held by the owners thereof for sale for com-
mercial uses and purposes . . . that there is no real or sub-
stantial difference between said property on the north side 
of Foothill Boulevard west of Mountain A venue and plaintiffs' 
said Boulevard Frontage and by reason thereof plaintiffs' 
said Boulevard Frontage is more reasonably suitable and 
usable for C-2 commercial uses and purposes, as such uses 
and purposes are authorized and permitted in a C-2 Zone 
by the terms of Zoning Ordinance No. 441, as amended, than 
for any other use or purpose. . . . 
"[T]hat the property, to a depth of ... (300) feet, situated 
in the unincorporated area of the County of Los Angeles 
and lying on both the northerly and southerly sides of Foothill 
Boulevard for a distance of several miles immediately westerly 
from plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage, is zoned for C-1 uses, 
as such uses are defined and permitted by the terms of said 
Los Angeles County Basic Zoning Ordinance No. 1494, as 
amended, and a substantial portion of such C-1 property is 
actually used for said C-1 uses; that the property immediately 
west of and adjoining plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage has 
been for several years, and now is, used for the sale of new 
and used automobile trailers, all of which have been, and 
now are, exhibited for sale by outdoor display on said property 
under and pursuant to a special permit or exception granted 
to the owners thereof by the Regional Planning Commission 
Mar.1958] JoHNSToN v. CITY oF CLAREMONT 
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of the County of Los Angeles . . . that in addition to said 
trailer sales business there are other commercial and business 
uses presently being made and carried on upon the property 
lying on the south side of said Foothill Boulevard between 
plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage and San Antonio A venue 
on the West, all of which business uses are in the unin-
corporated territory of the County of Los Angeles and in the 
same block as plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage, to wit, a 
gasoline filling station, a restaurant and a liquor store and 
that by reason of such uses and business being presently made 
and carried on, said property on the south side of Foothill 
Boulevard between plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage and 
said San Antonio A venue has a predominantly commercial 
character and aspect; that there is no real or substantial dif-
ference between said property in said unincorporated terri-
tory of the County of Los Angeles and plaintiffs' said Boule-
vard Frontage and the said zoning of such other property, 
and the uses to which the same is put, as aforesaid, render 
plaintiffs' said Boulevard Frontage more reasonably suitable 
and usable for commercial uses and purposes as authorized 
and permitted in a C-2 Zone by the terms of said Zoning 
Ordinance No. 441, as amended, of defendant City, than for 
any other use or purpose. 
"That it is true: that at all times since about the year 
1895 the northeast corner of plaintiffs' said Boulevard Front-
age at the intersection of Foothill Boulevard and Mountain 
A venue, consisting of a parcel of land of approximately 160 
feet by 160 feet, both of said measurements being taken from 
the intersection of Foothill Boulevard and Mountain A venue, 
has been, and now is, known as the 'Reservoir Site'; that 
since about the year 1895 said 'Reservoir Site' has been used 
for a commercial purpose, to wit : for a reservoir for the 
storage and distribution of water for a number of users ; . . . 
that in addition to said reservoir there has been since about 
the year 1930, and there now is, a water well and pumping 
plant upon said 'Reservoir Site' for the commercial production 
of water; ... that said The North Palomares Irrigation Com-
pany has been at all times since 1930, and now is, engaged 
in the business of producing and distributing water originating 
from said well and pumping plant to numerous customers 
and users; that said well and pumping plant emit noises in 
the pumping of water from said well, which noises can be 
heard a distance of approximately 160 feet away; that the 
aforesaid reservoir upon said 'Reservoir Site' provide an 
'' 'rhat it is 
erty 
said Boulevard 
that the use of 
any third 
''That it is true : that the said Downtown Business District 
of defendant City, zoned for C-2 purposes the 
terms of Ordinance No. mcludes an 
area of one one-half bounded on 
the north by 4th Street and on the 3rd Street and 
on the west Alexander A venue and on the east the 
alley one-half block east of Yale Avenue. in which one and 
one-half blocks all of the is developed 
and improved with residences a service station on 
the northeast corner of 3rd and Yale A venue ; that the re-
mammg of said Downtown Business District is sub-
stantially completely occupied stores and business build-
ings on lots of a of 50 feet or all 
of which are owned numerous owners thereof with only 
three small vacant lots therein that the surrounding 
and immediately adjoining said Downtown Business District 
is substantially all built upon with residences and other 
buildings; that plaintiffs do not own the upon which 
plaintiffs conduct their said automobile business 
and plaintiffs lease the same from two different landlords .... '' 
Summarizing. ' property not usable for either 
residential or purposes ; it is surrounded by 
commercially used property ; there is no room for expansion of 
commercial projects in the commercial zone in Claremont 
under ordinance No. hence the business now there is 
granted a on the business activities in the com-
munity. Such constitutes a of property without due 
process of law and is unconstitutionaL Plaintiffs are left 





Not only do 
after 
ordinance 
there was no reasonable basis for hav-
ing for residential and agricuJ-
tural uses, when the authorities of Los Angele!< 
County zoned all of the around 
mercial. Thus such cases as Lockard v, 
33 Ca1.2d 453 P.2d 7 A.hR.2d . are not in point. 
In fact they support the conclusion I have reached as it is there 
said: " ... that when reasonable in object 
and not arbitrary in constitute a justifiable exer-
cise of police power." v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 
33 Cal.2d 453, Under the in the Lockard 
case the class in which ' property was zoned was 
arbitrary and capricious and its reasonableness is not ''fairly 
debatable." The time it was considered in the sense 
that a was held was when ordinance No. 513 was 
passed which as commerciaL 
There was no the referendum election and 
the close vote on the matter showed that the question was 
more than " debatable." The court must, as 
Lockard says, "look " the results of that election and 
determine the reasonableness of the zoning, giving consid-
eration to the "character of the " the "nature of 
the surrounding territory," the "use" to which it has been 
put and the "recent trends of " All those 
factors point to one conclusion here : The property has 
no use or value for ; the rvidence 
shows this without so found. It is 
aptly said in 
196 Cal. 211, 2113 
is not under the 
segregating it to a 
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to business establishments and enterprises already situated 
in unrestricted districts. (In re White, 195 Cal. 516 [234 
P. 396] .) " In Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 
332, 340 [175 P.2d 542], it is said that zoning ordinances 
are invalid "Where the restrictions create a monopoly," 
''Where the use of adjacent properly renders the land en-
tirely unsuited to or unusable for the only purpose permitted 
by the ordinance," (emphasis added) and "Where a small 
parcel is restricted and given less rights than the surrounding 
property, as where a lot in the center of a business or com-
mercial district is limited to use for residential purposes, 
thereby creating an 'island' in the middle of a larger area 
devoted to other uses.'' While Lockard and Wilkins upheld 
the validity of the zoning there, they did not involve a case 
such as we have here, where the use of the adjacent property 
renders the land unsuited for the limited uses imposed by 
the zoning. A case closely in point is Skalko v. City of Sunny-
vale, 14 Cal.2d 213 [93 P.2d 93]. There plaintiff's property 
was, as here, zoned residential, but it was near a large can-
nery which emitted noise and on a highway carrying heavy 
traffic and ''As described by the appellant, his property con-
sists of five acres upon which he had prune trees at one time. 
These trees were removed because of the insects which came 
over to them from the piled boxes of the cannery across the 
street, and there is now nothing on it but a barn and a 
house worth about $1,000." (P. 215.) Similarly, here we 
have the noise and the lessened value of the property for 
agricultural uses. Holding the ordinance invalid the court 
said (p. 216): "Considering all the facts shown by the record, 
it clearly appears beyond question that the land owned by the 
appellant is entirely unsuited for residential purposes. The 
adjoining cannery with the continuous noise which must 
necessarily result from twenty-four hour operation, creates 
a situation similar to that which is found in the industrial 
part of a great city. Certainly no one wants to live next door 
to a large factory, and the question whether any consideration 
of public health, peace, safety or general welfare justifies the 
continued restriction upon the appellant's property which 
prohibits its use for commercial purposes is not fairly de-
batable. In its application to the land owned by the appellant, 
the ordinance is void." (Emphasis added.) The identical 
facts appear in the case at bar. 
I would therefore affirm the judgment on the ground that 
ordinance No. 441 is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs' 
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property. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to deter· 
mine whether ordinance No. 513 rezoning plaintiffs' property 
to commercial uses was subject to referendum or otherwise 
valid and effective. 
Shenk, J ., and Schauer, J ., concurred. 
The petition of plaintiffs and appellants for a rehearing was 
denied April 23, 1958. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., 
were of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
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